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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In Mr. Hochrein's case, defense counsel and the prosecutor entered into a 
factual stipulation that admitted several essential elements of the charged offense of 
felony violation of a no contact order. The district court entered this stipulation without 
first creating any record that Mr. Hochrein had waived his Sixth Amendment and due 
process right to a jury determination regarding these essential elements of his charged 
offense. In addition to his other claims on appeal1, and under well-established 
principles of law, Mr. Hochrein asserts that this constitutional violation rose to the level 
of a fundamental error, as well as a structural error, which entitles him to a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hochrein's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Supplemental 
Appellant's Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 The Idaho Court of Appeals has permitted Mr. Hochrein to raise this issue on appeal, 
in addition to those issues raised in his prior Appellant's Brief in this case, pursuant to 
Mr. Hochrein's Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Brief. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err, and violate Mr. Hochrein's right to a jury trial and to due 
process, when the district court accepted a factual stipulation entered into by 
Mr. Hochrein's counsel that relieved the State of its burden of proof as to essential 
elements of the charged offense without obtaining Mr. Hochrein's personal waiver of his 
right to a jury determination as to these elements; and did this error rise to the level of 
both a fundamental and a structural error that requires a new trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Hochrein's Right To A Jury Trial And To Due 
Process, When The District Court Accepted A Factual Stipulation Entered Into By 
Mr. Hochrein's Counsel That Relieved The State Of Its Burden Of Proof As To Essential 
Elements Of The Charged Offense Without Obtaining Mr. Hochrein's Personal Waiver 
Of His Right To A JUry Determination As To These Elements; And This Error Rose To 
The Level Of Both A Fundamental And A Structural Error That Requires A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
It is well-established law that due process and the right to a jury trial in a criminal 
case carries with it the guarantee that the State must prove every element of the 
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. It is equally established under Idaho law 
that the right to a jury determination is personal to the defendant, and the waiver of this 
right must be made by the defendant alone - it is not a matter of strategic determination 
that can be made by trial counsel. In order to effectuate the personal nature of this 
right, established Idaho law requires that any waiver of this right to a jury determination 
must be made on the record and the waiver must be shown from the record to be 
knowing, intelligent and voluntary on the part of the defendant. 
In this case, the factual stipulation that waived the jury's determination as to 
essential elements of the charged offense was solely entered into by defense counsel 
and the prosecutor. There is no record that Mr. Hochrein had personally waived his 
right to a jury determination as to these elements, nor that any waiver on his part was 
entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Mr. Hochrein submits that this was 
not only fundamental error, but also structural error, that requires reversal of his 
conviction. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
In cases of unobjected to error, this Court applies a three-step process of review 
to determine whether the error alleged rises to the level of a fundamental error. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). First, the defendant must demonstrate that one or 
more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated. Id. Second, the 
error must be clear and obvious from the record without the need for additional 
information not contained within the record on appeal. Id. Finally, the defendant must 
show the error affected the defendant's sUbstantial rights. Id. As to this last prong, the 
defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the error complained of affected the 
outcome of the trial. 
C. The District Court Erred, And Violated Mr. Hochrein's Right To A Jury Trial And 
To Due Process, When The District Court Accepted A Factual Stipulation 
Entered Into By Mr. Hochrein's Counsel That Relieved The State Of Its Burden 
Of Proof As To Essential Elements Of The Charged Offense Without Obtaining 
Mr. Hochrein's Personal Waiver Of His Right To A Jury Determination As To 
These Elements; And This Error Rose To The Level Of Both A Fundamental And 
A Structural Error That Requires A New Trial 
In this case, Mr. Hochrein's counsel and the prosecutor entered into two factual 
stipulations, largely identical in content, that admitted several essential elements of the 
charged offense in this case of felony violation of a no contact order. (State's Exhibits 
3, 3A.) These factual stipulations conceded that: (1) a no contact order was issued 
against Mr. Hochrein in a prior criminal case, and the no contact order was in effect at 
the time of the alleged contact; (2) the order was issued pursuant to a charge or 
conviction that would properly support issuance of such a no contact order; and (3) that 
the no contact order prohibited contact with Ms. Lewis. (State's Exhibits 3, 3A.) Under 
the statute defining Mr. Hochrein's offense, this stipulation covered several essential 
elements of his charged offense. See I.C. §§ 18-920(2)(a), (b), (c). 
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The stipulations were read to the jury prior to the presentation of the State's 
case-in-chief, as well as later on during the presentation of evidence during trial. (Trial 
Tr., p.141, L.16 - p.142, L.9, p.222, L.13 - p.224, L.22.) Mr. Hochrein never personally 
signed either stipulation. (State's Exhibits 3, 3A.) Nor did the district court ever 
question Mr. Hochrein personally as to whether he understood the legal effect of his 
waiver, as to the fact that he had a right to a jury determination as to each of the 
elements stipulated to, nor did the court ask any questions to otherwise ensure that 
Mr. Hochrein was personally waiving his jury trial rights and was doing so in a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary manner. (See Trial Tr., generally.) 
In accepting this stipulation without ever obtaining a personal waiver from 
Mr. Hochrein of his right to a jury determination as to these essential elements of the 
charged offense, the district court violated Mr. Hochrein's well-established constitutional 
rights to due process and a fair trial. 
Where a defendant stands on his or her right to a jury trial in a criminal case, the 
State carries the burden of proving every essential element of the charged offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685 (Ct. App. 
2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 
925, 942 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47 (Ct. App. 2000)); State v. Gusman, 
125 Idaho 810,813 (Ct. App. 1993). If the defendant is deprived of the right to a jury 
determination as to each of the elements of the charged offense, this violates a 
defendant's constitutional rights to a jury trial and to due process. State v. Nath, 137 
Idaho 712, 716-717 (2002) (jury instruction that removed essential element from the 
jury's consideration violated defendant's right to a jury trial and to due process). 
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Moreover, the right to a jury determination as to each element of the charged 
offense in a criminal case is personal to the defendant, and may not be waived solely by 
trial counsel. State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 964-966 (1985). This is the case even 
where the defendant was present at the time the waiver was made by defense counsel 
and does not voice any objection at that time. Id. The character of the waiver of the 
right to a jury determination must be shown from the record to be knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary on the part of the defendant; and the inference of a constitutionally valid 
waiver will not be inferred from a silent record. State v. Watson, 99 Idaho 694, 702 
(1978). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. Cheatham is instructive on this 
question. State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413 (Ct. App. 2003). In Cheatham, defense 
counsel stipulated to the truth of the State's persistent violator allegation following a jury 
trial on the underlying criminal charges. Id. at 414-415. Although the defendant was 
present at the time of counsel's stipulation, the district court never asked the defendant 
whether he assented to the stipulation or understood its effect regarding the State's 
burden of proof or with regard to the ultimate punishment the defendant would 
thereafter face. Id. at 415. 
The Cheatham Court held that this was reversible error. Cheatham, 139 Idaho at 
418-419. The court first noted that the defendant had the right to a jury determination 
as to the facts stipulated to by trial counsel. Id. at 416. After canvassing various cases 
from other jurisdictions on similar issues, the Cheatham court held that, "due process 
principles preclude the acceptance to the truth of persistent violator allegations without 
judicial inquiry to determine that the defendant makes the admission voluntarily and with 
an understanding of the consequences. Id. at 417-418. The court further held that a 
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record demonstrating solely that defense counsel entered into this stipulation is not 
sufficient to showing a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the defendant. Id. 
In this case, there is no record that Mr. Hochrein ever personally waived his right 
to a jury determination as to the essential elements of his charged offense that were 
contained within the stipulation entered into by his trial counsel and the prosecutor. The 
stipulations themselves were only signed by Mr. Hochrein's counsel and the prosecutor. 
(State's Exhibits 3, 3A.) The district court never questioned Mr. Hochrein on the record 
about this stipulation in order to insure that his waiver of the right to a jury determination 
as to these elements was being made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. (See Trial 
Tr., general/y.) Under clearly established law, this violated Mr. Hochrein's due process 
rights to a jury determination as to each element of the charged offense. 
This error could not have been the result of a strategic determination on the part 
of trial counsel, as Idaho law clearly establishes that the decision whether or not to insist 
upon the right to a jury determination rests solely with the defendant, and cannot be 
made as a strategic determination by trial counsel. Swan, 108 Idaho at 964-966. The 
absence of any valid waiver, made personally and on the record by Mr. Hochrein, is 
also plain on the face of the record in this case. Thus, the remaining question for this 
Court is whether this error requires reversal. Mr. Hochrein submits that this error rises 
to the level of a structural error for which prejudice must be presumed. However, even 
assuming that Mr. Hochrein must demonstrate prejudice, he submits that the prejudice 
of this error requires reversal. 
This error is a species of the sort of error recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Sullivan v. Louisiana to be a structural error that is not amenable to the traditional 
harmless error test. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-282 (1993). The 
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traditional harmless error test looks not to what hypothetical verdict may have been 
rendered by a jury in absence of the error, but to what the impact was on the actual jury 
in the particular case on appeal. Id. at 279-280. In the case of a factual stipulation that 
relieves the State of its burden of proof as to every element, because the stipulation is 
the only "evidence" on the issue, there could be no verdict as to every element of the 
State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in absence of the stipulation. 
Accordingly, such errors will always and will necessarily have contributed to the jury's 
verdict. Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-282; see also Swan, 108 Idaho at 966 (reversing and 
remanding the case for a new trial without engaging in a harmless error analysis where 
defense counsel, but not the defendant, waived the right to a jury trial). 
Even if this error does not rise to the level of a structural error, upon which 
prejudice is presumed, it was certainly not a harmless error in this particular case. As 
was noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan, this Court may not assume a 
hypothetical set of facts under which jurors received evidence that was not actually 
submitted in this case to determine whether this hypothetical jury would still have 
convicted the defendant. Id. at 279-280. "That must be so, because to hypothesize a 
guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered - no matter how inescapable the findings 
to support that verdict might be - would violate the jury trial guarantee." Id. 
Accordingly, this Court must determine whether, under the state of the evidence as it 
actually existed at Mr. Hochrein's trial, there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
complained of affected the outcome of the trial. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
This standard has been met. In the absence of this unlawful and constitutionally 
invalid stipulation, the State presented no evidence to the jury of the existence of the 
prior no contact order, the terms of its duration or the scope of its coverage, or whether 
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it was issued for a criminal charge or conviction for which such an order could 
appropriately be issued. Each of these facts constitute elements of the charged 
offense. See I.C. § 18-920(2). The underlying criminal no contact orders that 
Mr. Hochrein was alleged to have violated were never presented to the jury at trial, 
although they were presented by the State at the preliminary hearing. Because this 
stipulation was the only evidence of several elements of the charged offense in this 
case, there is reason to believe that the erroneous admission of the invalid stipulation in 
this case contributed to the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hochrein respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for felony 
violation of a no contact order with prejudice because the State presented insufficient 
evidence to sustain this conviction. In the alternative, Mr. Hochrein asks that this Court 
reverse his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony violation of a no contact 
order and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 4th day of September, 2012. 
SARAH E. TOMPK 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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